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This paper focuses on the curious episode in Iberian American history when Princess 
Carlota Joaquina, daughter of Carlos IV, brother of Fernando VII of Spain, and wife of 
Dom João, Prince Regent of Portugal and later King João VI of Portugal, tried to assert 
sovereignty over the Spanish monarchy, in whole or in part, during 1808-10. Although 
Carlota‟s pretensions were unsuccessful, they are nonetheless worthy of discussion for a 
number of reasons. Not least of these is the light that Carlota‟s proposal throws on the 
crisis of monarchy in the Spanish world immediately after 1808, and the context it 
provides for assessing the resilience of both monarchy and monarchism in Spanish 
America during the couple of decades that followed.  
Carlota’s Proposal 
The „Carlotist project‟, if we may call it that, seems to have originated in the Portuguese 
court in early 1808, shortly after the royal family and its entourage had fled from Lisbon 
to Rio de Janeiro, to avoid capture by Napoleon‟s invading army. The immediate context 
was one in which Portugal aimed at revenge against Spain for cooperating with 
Napoleon‟s invasion of Portugal, agreed at the Treaty of Fontainebleau (which allowed 
French armies to attack Portugal from Spanish territory in return for a promise to 
partition the Portuguese monarchy). Once the centre of Portugal‟s empire was established 
in Rio, the Prince Regent Dom João began immediately to seek ways to extend his power 
into Spanish South America, in consort with Britain, his chief ally. His primary target 
was the Spanish Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata where Portugal had long-standing 
ambitions to extend the boundaries of Brazil south to the banks of the Río de la Plata, into 
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the region known as the Banda Oriental. It was at this time that the idea of placing the 
Infanta Carlota Joaquina on a Spanish throne first appeared.  
The idea surfaced in Rio de Janeiro amidst schemes for securing British backing for a 
Portuguese invasion of the Río de la Plata. In March 1808, the Portuguese foreign 
minister Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho (later the Conde de Linhares) used this threat to try 
to intimidate the cabildo of Buenos Aires into accepting the „protection‟ of Portuguese. 
When this offer was refused, Sousa Coutinho persuaded Princess Carlota to approach the 
cabildo of Buenos Aires with an offer to act as Regent of the Viceroyalty.
 1
  At this point, 
the scheme attracted its first adherents in Buenos Aires, among members of the 
Audiencia and local notables who hoped that an alliance with Carlota would forestall a 
British military assault. 
2
  
Rumours of an imminent British attack in the River Plate region were well-founded. 
Spain had good reason to suspect an attack there, given that the British had already made 
two attempts in 1806-7, and after the Portuguese flight to Brazil, Spanish fear of a fresh 
attack increased. British cabinet papers show that ministers were certainly discussing this 
possibility from the end of 1807. In December 1807, Castlereagh recommended taking a 
position in the River Plate from which Britain could protect its trade and its ally in Brazil, 
and influence events in Spanish America. In February 1808, he went a step further and 
favoured plans to encourage independence in Spanish America, if possible under a 
constitutional monarchy. Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith was sent to Rio 
with a British naval squadron, tasked with patrolling the eastern coast of South America 
against French attack. On arriving at Rio in May 1808 he became a strong advocate for a 
joint British-Portuguese invasion of the Río de la Plata. Thus, when Strangford, the 
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British envoy to the Portuguese court, arrived in July 1808, he was presented with plans 
for a Portuguese attack on Spanish territory, supported by the British navy.
3
 
At this time, however, news began to arrive in July-August 1808 of the great upheaval 
in Spain caused by the kidnap of Fernando VII and the subsequent rebellion of Spaniards 
against the French. With this, came revival of the project for a regency in Spanish 
America. From the Brazilian court, Carlota and her cousin Don Pedro Carlos issued 
manifestos expressing their solidarity with the Spanish Bourbons and willingness to 
defend their rights. Carlota seemed at this time to be ready to give precedence to Pedro 
Carlos, but, as the prospects for a Spanish American regency improved, she began to 
present herself as the prime candidate.
4
 The scheme had obvious attractions for the Prince 
Regent who, though he hated his wife, saw that his power would be reinforced if she 
were to take up position as a Spanish Regent in neighbouring Río de la Plata, and might 
even lead to the unification of the two monarchies.  
The proposal that Carlota might become Regent failed to attract support in Spanish 
official circles. The leading officials in Spanish America who received her August 
manifesto sent polite but non-committal replies, while Viceroy Liniers in Buenos Aires 
exchanged letters but offered no support. Nor were her credentials taken seriously in 
Spain. The Junta Central rejected the idea of her Regency in September 1808 on the 
grounds that she had acted without the consent of the Spanish government, and continued 
to oppose it when, in November-December 1808, she argued that she should act as 
Regent for the entire Spanish monarchy.  
On the other hand, her proposal did attract interest in American circles in Rio de 
Janeiro and Buenos Aires, among those who favoured the independence of Río de la 
Plata. From Rio, the pro-independence exile Saturnino Rodríguez Peña (who had been an 
ally of the British during their second invasion of Buenos Aires and was forced to leave 
when the British pulled out) set up contacts to carry out negotiations with likely allies in 
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Buenos Aires, and Manuel Belgrano, later a key leader of independent Buenos Aires, 
entered into correspondence with Carlota on behalf of his political associates. For such 
men, Carlota‟s proposal suggested a way to achieve independence with Portuguese and 




This was an imaginative but impractical scheme. Carlota had strong support from 
Admiral Smith, who saw her as a means to prevent the French-backed republican 
takeover in Buenos Aires that he feared and a guardian of British interests there. In 
November 1808, he sent his own secret envoy, James Paroissien, to Buenos Aires to 
negotiate with Peña‟s contacts on Carlota‟s behalf. However, despite her friendship with 
Smith, Carlota pulled back. Her secretary persuaded her that she was being manipulated 
by rioplatense subversives who wanted an independent republic, and she scuppered 
Smith‟s plans by denouncing Paroissien to the authorities in Buenos Aires, in the hope 
that this might win favour with Viceroy Liniers.
6
  In fact, her behaviour did not have the 
desired effect. On the contrary, it simply persuaded the Spanish authorities that the 
British were covertly planning their overthrow and encouraged them to be on their guard 
against their ally. However, this betrayal did not end Carlota‟s intrigues. In 1809-10, she 
made further attempts to win support in Buenos Aires, through the contacts made by her 
personal agent, the Portuguese Felipe Contucci,. Indeed, Contucci raised her hopes by 
informing in mid-November 1808 that 124 leading men were ready to support 
intervention by a military force led by the Infante Pedro Carlos and supported by Admiral 
Smith, to install her the constitutional monarch of an independent kingdom.  
This scheme made no more progress than its predecessors. The Portuguese foreign 
minister Sousa Coutinho joined with British ambassador Strangford in resolute 
opposition to Carlota‟s plans, and the Prince Regent insisted that the British government 
recall Admiral Smith for his unwarranted intrusion into Portuguese affairs. The Spanish 
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government in the Peninsula also moved to block Carlota‟s schemes. When the Marqués 
de Casa Irujo, the Spanish ambassador arrived in Rio in August 1809, he brought 
instructions from the Junta Central to prevent Carlota from entering Spanish territory and 
to deflect her ambitions to become Regent. Carlota responded by changing her tactics 
rather than abandoning her ambitions.
7
 In late 1809-10, she cut her secret contacts with 
creole conspirators in Buenos Aires and, as Spain‟s internal crisis deepened, tried to 
convince Casa Irujo in Rio and Spanish officials in Buenos Aires that her Regency 
offered the best hope for sustaining Spanish rule. Viceroy Cisneros took no notice, 
however, and nor, after the May Revolution of 1810, did the Junta of Buenos Aires. 
Convinced that it had the tacit recognition of the British government, the Junta saw no 
future for Carlota‟s proposal, and, to emphasise the point, informed the British that it 
would prefer government by Bonaparte to rule by Carlota or the Portuguese.  
The Carlotist project did not quite end there. After the May revolution in Buenos 
Aires, royalists in Montevideo saw Carlota as a potential ally. In June 1810, José María 
Salazar, the naval commander and loyalist leader in Montevideo, wrote to the Marqués de 
Casa Irujo to ask for Carlota‟s help in defending the River Plata region for Spain, as well 
as British support in the blockade of Buenos Aires 
8
 The response was negative, not 
because Carlota was unwilling but because she had no means to intervene on 
Montevideo‟s behalf. In reply to Salazar, she acknowledged that it was her duty, as 
brother of Fernando VII, to help a „loyal people‟ but she also pointed, somewhat vaguely, 
to „the obstacles which continue to stand in the way of my ideas and just operations.‟ As 
compensation, she provided a gift of jewels and plate worth over 50,000 pesos,  a gesture 
which Salazar admiringly described as „la acción heroica que caracteriza la grandeza de 
alma de una Infanta Española‟.9 Casa Irujo meanwhile blocked cooperation from 
Montevideo, informing Salazar and Governor Soria that they should not send a 
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deputation to her in Rio as she had asked, except in the extreme circumstances that 
Montevideo should fall to Buenos Aires.
10
 
The attempt to resuscitate Carlota‟s plans to intervene in the Río de la Plata to defend 
the royalist cause thus amounted to very little. Not only were the Prince Regent, the 
Portuguese foreign minister and the British envoy all opposed, but the new government 
which had emerged in Spain from the collapse of the Central Junta at the end of 1809 was 
no more favourable to Carlota than its predecessor. In January 1810, the Junta had 
mandated its own Regency, inaugurated by a five-man Regency Council, and the 
convocation of the Cortes in March 1810 saw the inception of a constitutional monarchy 
which had no reason to be even slightly interested in Carlota‟s candidacy. The subsequent 
establishment of juntas in Buenos Aires and in other Spanish American cities from April 
1810, all proclaiming to act as the depositaries of sovereignty in Fernando VII‟s absence, 
reduced Carlota‟s relevance to vanishing point. So ended the politically eccentric, though 
not legally impossible, scheme for a Carlotist Regency which had greatly excited Carlota 
herself and had for some months seemed to dissidents in Buenos Aires to be a possible 
vehicle for their plans for independence. 
Historical Significance of the Carlotist Project 
Given that it failed to have any lasting impact on the politics of Hispanic world, what 
is the historical significance of Carlota‟s attempt to make herself a Regent in the Spanish 
monarchy? It was, perhaps, more apparent in the Portuguese than the Spanish world. For, 
a decade after her failure to wield power in her own right in Spanish America and after 
the Braganza court had returned to Portugal, Carlota rekindled her ambitions as a political 
actor. When King João was disposed to accept a constitution in 1821, Queen Carlota tried 
to replace him with the army commander, their son Prince Miguel. Her conspiracy failed, 
but it deepened antagonisms in Portuguese politics, with consequences that projected into 
the years that followed.  
In the Spanish world, Carlota‟s attempt to intervention was less forceful and her 
influence much shallower. Nonetheless, when seen in the context of Spanish American 
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history, she presents an interesting figure because her attempts to intervene in Spanish 
American government emphasise the depth of the crisis caused by the fall of Fernando 
VII, and illuminate the character of the conflicts and contradictions which arose from it.  
First, Carlota‟s intrigues provide a perspective on the Spanish crisis which is often 
ignored: namely, the part played by foreign powers in the defence and dismemberment of 
the Spanish monarchy, and in particular the part played by the Portuguese monarchy in 
the affairs of the Spanish monarchy to which, from 1808, it was allied. Although 
Carlota‟s plans deflated, the Portuguese government in Rio de Janeiro continued to play 
an important part in the political theatre of the River Plate for years to come, thanks 
partly to the attempts made by political opponents in Montevideo and Buenos Aires to 
manipulate the government of Brazil for their own ends. On one side, Buenos Aires tried 
to persuade the people of Montevideo that they should unite to resist Portuguese 
expansion into the Banda Oriental. On the other side, the Spanish authorities in 
Montevideo turned to Brazil for military support when it was threatened in 1811 by 
assaults from Spanish American enemies. Viceroy Elío invited a Portuguese army to 
enter the Banda Oriental in order to save Montevideo from military defeat. This was a 
very risky manoeuvre because there was no guarantee that, once installed as protectors of 
Spanish sovereignty, the Portuguese would ever leave. Elío simply trusted that Britain. 
Spain‟s other ally and power in the region, would persuade the Portuguese to return to 
Brazil. In this instance, they did leave, but only to return in 1816 on the pretence that they 
were retaking Montevideo from Buenos Aires. Carlota duly wrote to the Spanish 
government to assure it that Portuguese aggression was directly solely against Buenos 
Aires, but it soon became clear –to Carlota‟s consternation- that King Joao intended to 
remain in the Banda Oriental.
11
 Thus began the severance of the region from Spanish rule 
and its incorporation for some years into the kingdom of Brazil.  
Second, Carlota‟s intrigues in Buenos Aires draw attention to its peculiarities in 
comparison to the other Spanish America cities. In Buenos Aires, unlike other Spanish 
American capitals, there were groupings who, as a consequence of the British invasions 
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of 1806-7, had already contemplated independence and were ready to seize opportunities 
to secure it when the Spanish crisis started in 1808. Buenos Aires had responded with an 
extraordinary display of loyalty to the Spanish crown when the British invaded, but in 
repelling the British, they also ousted the viceroy and changed the balance of local 
political power. The creation of a large force of militia companies which elected their 
own officers and were paid by the government, decisively altered the politics of Buenos 
Aires. The city had experienced a de facto autonomy which made it open to ideas of 
independence, and the militia officers became potentially important political actors, in 
command of autonomous military units. Buenos Aires was, moreover, a city in close 
contact with the politics of the Portuguese monarchy, through its maritime connections 
with the city of Rio de Janeiro. The presence of political exiles from Buenos Aires (men 
like Saturnino Peña, who had moved because they had tried to use the British to secure 
independence from Spain) acted as the bridge between Carlota and those politicians in 
Buenos Aires who saw opportunities for themselves in the onset of Spain‟s crisis. If 
Carlota achieved some initial purchase in Buenos Aires, it was because she offered a 
means of achieving independence without offending the British.  
Thirdly, and more generally, the Carlotist project reminds us of the importance of the 
concept of monarchy and its resilience as a form of government in both Spain and 
Spanish America during the crisis of the Bourbon regime. Although Carlota‟s pretensions 
were ignored, her aim of defending the Spanish throne was widely shared throughout the 
Spanish world. Spaniards and Spanish Americans, however, employed a different reading 
of the political theory of kingship. While Carlota argued that her brother‟s throne was 
best defended by a dynastic heir until he was restored, Fernando VII‟s subjects ignored 
her claims. This was not simply because she was a woman. In fact, in 1789 Carlos IV had 
abolished the Salic law introduced by Felipe V, because he wished to prevent the 
succession of his brother, the King of Naples, but at the time had no male heir. Thus 
Carlota acquired a legal claim to the succession which she could exercise when the male 
heir was unavailable.
12
  Her problem was that this claim was not taken seriously by the 
new political bodies which emerged in Spain in 1808. These provincial juntas simply did 
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not contemplate a Bourbon candidate to replace Fernando VII; they claimed instead that 
sovereignty had passed to the sovereign people, and they presented themselves as the 
depositaries of that sovereignty. Moreover, the Infanta Carlota and the Infante Pedro 
Carlos lacked political leverage in Spain: the Spanish princess and her cousin were in 
Brazil, had no contacts in Spanish politics, and thus did not appear to be viable actors on 
the Spanish political scene. And, of course, there was the problem of Carlota‟s close 
connection to a Portuguese monarchy that many Spaniards still regarded as an enemy, 
notwithstanding British insistence that, from 1808, Spain and Portugal were partners in 
the war against Napoleon. Thus, while the leaders who took over the residual Spanish 
state during the juntista and centralista period (1808-10) shared Carlota‟s commitment to 
preserving the Spanish Bourbon monarchy, they had no good reason to see her role as a 
regent as the obvious means to ensure its survival.  
The Survival of the Spanish Monarchy in the Crisis of 1808-10 
The refusal to admit Carlota‟s claims did no damage to the continuity of Bourbon 
kingship in Spain or Spanish America. In Spain, the king‟s legitimacy was not in question 
and he remained the crucial figure in political thought and practice that he had been 
before the crisis. Anti-monarchism had never established a strong foothold in Spain, 
despite the fears among Spanish ministers during the 1790s that revolutionary 
contamination might reach across the Pyrenees. The Bourbon monarchy also weathered 
infighting at court, where the opposition of a fernandino faction to Godoy culminated in 
the Aranjuez coup which removed Godoy and forced the abdication of Carlos IV in 
March 1808. However, neither this, nor the perception that Fernando VII had allowed 
himself to be victimized by Napoleon, seems to have damaged the concept of monarchy. 
On the contrary, the profound crisis of the monarchy caused by Fernando VII‟s capture 
transformed him into a mythical figure who symbolized the Christian virtues of a just 
Spanish king against the impious vices of the tyrant Napoleon.  
It is worth noting, too, that the crisis of 1808 was not a crisis of monarchy per se. It 
did not arise from ideological and political challenge within Spanish society but was a 
dynastic crisis triggered by Napoleon‟s usurpation of the Bourbon throne. Napoleon‟s 
action was not designed to abolish monarchy in Spain; he simply aimed to convert Spain 
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into a more reliable ally by replacing a dynasty which had originated in the family of 
Louis XIV with another dynasty of much more recent French origins, drawn from his 
own family. His effort to strengthen the Spanish monarchical state by changing its 
leadership and its constitution did not have the intended effect, however, for it was very 
different from Bourbon succession to the Habsburgs in 1700. Then, the French candidate 
Philippe d‟Anjou was acceptable because he was a Catholic prince, destined to take the 
throne by the testament of Carlos II and the hand of God. Joseph Bonaparte, by contrast, 
was a heretic who had taken power illegally and by force of arms. So, rather than 
effecting a smooth transition from Bourbon to Bonapartist rule, the imposition of King 
Jose I on the Spanish throne provoked multiple rebellions and provided the setting for 
political revolution throughout the Spanish world. 
Initially, the principle of monarchy survived this upheaval because those who opposed 
Napoleon did so in the shared political language of the old regime: they rallied to the 
recently-anointed Fernando VII, merging defence of the king with defence of country and 
religion.  The juntas which were convoked throughout Spain in 1808 justified themselves 
as temporary depositaries of the sovereignty of king: they claimed their authority in the 
name of Fernando VII and did not imagine any kind of government which was not 
legitimated by the royal connection. This position of loyalty to the king solidified under 
the Central Junta in 1809 until, with the convocation of the Cortes at Cádiz in 1810, a 
new vision of the future of the monarchy became possible. For, from the deliberations of 
the Cortes, a constitutional monarchy emerged, verified by the Cádiz Constitution of 
1812.  
Monarchy in Spanish America during the Interregnum 
Ongoing support for Fernando VII in Spain guaranteed the continuity of monarchy in 
America. When news of Napoleon‟s usurpation and Spain‟s rebellion arrived (shortly 
after Spanish Americans had celebrated the proclamation of Fernando VII as king), their 
response to his usurpation was an extraordinary affirmation of continuing loyalty, backed 
by financial support through taxes and voluntary donations. This situation changed in 
early 1810, with the arrival of reports that France had overrun the Peninsula and that the 
Junta, after taking refuge in Cádiz, had transferred its authority to a Regency Council. 
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But the language of monarchism still prevailed. The juntas de gobierno which emerged 
from American cabildos during 1810 were invariably royalist in their rhetoric, 
proclaiming themselves as defenders of Fernando VII and depositaries of sovereignty in 
his absence.  
Such continuity is unsurprising. Despite the sometimes unpopular innovations 
introduced by the Bourbons during the previous century, at the time of the imperial crisis 
anti-monarchist sentiments were almost as rare in Spanish America as in Spain. Although 
Bourbon fiscal and administrative innovations had triggered some serious disturbances 
during the reign of Carlos III, the hegemony of monarchism was plainly inscribed in the 
rebellions provoked by reform. The slogan, „Viva el rey y muera el mal gobierno‟, 
reflected their conservative cast: participants called for an end to „bad government‟ not 
monarchy, and castigated the king‟s ministers, not the king. Even where there was some 
claim to self-government, as in the rebellion of the barrios in Quito (where there was talk 
of making the Conde de Selva Florida the king of Quito) and in the great southern 
Andean rebellion (where Túpac Amaru suggested that he might rule as king of Peru), the 
rights of the Spanish king were never fully nor seriously denied. Bourbon regalism, with 
its more centralised, authoritarian and utilitarian idea of the state, was unwelcome to 
those accustomed to the practices of the Habsburg plural monarchy, no doubt, but 
resistance was largely expressed and contained within the institutional order. Burgeoning 
American regional identities gave new energy to creole patriotism, but this not 
necessarily translate into opposition to the monarchy. American „ilustrados‟ looked for a 
new place within the monarchy, not outside it, and, in criticising the backwardness of 
their societies, were inclined to see the crown as the essential agent for reform „from 
above‟ in highly-conservative social and cultural milieux. Outright opposition to 
monarchy was very rare, even after the American and French revolutions. Although 
republicanism became fashionable among educated, generally younger, sections of the 
American upper classes towards the end of the century, it rarely translated into political 
action. The occasional conspiracies which incorporated ideas about the overthrow of 
monarchy and separation from Spain (such as Nariño and others in Santafé de Bogotá in 
1796, Gual and España in Caracas in 1797, Miranda‟s abortive attempt to promote 
revolution in Venezuela in 1806) showed that only very small minorities entertained 
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ideas from the European revolutionary tradition, and fewer still participated in 
conspiracies which were far outside the mainstream of political life and culture. When the 
Bourbon monarchy collapsed, it was because of French intervention, not colonial 
rebellion. Only when the crisis was underway did „enlightened‟ ideas contribute to the 
construction of political alternatives to the Spanish monarchy. And such alternatives did 
not emerge immediately, nor did they follow some pre-determined pattern of replacing 
one political system for another; they arose instead from the complicated process of 
political experimentation with which Americans responded to the „decapitation‟ of the 
monarchy in 1808.  
The most common response to political turmoil was in a monarchist idiom. Its most 
obvious exponents were the government functionaries and other beneficiaries of the old 
regime, such as Peninsular merchants and many of the clergy, who opposed any 
challenge to Spanish sovereignty and struggled to sustain the status quo ante 1810. Their 
commitment no doubt took various forms, but underpinning it was a powerful body of 
ideas which represented the king as the guarantor of peace, dispenser of justice, and 
protector of the Catholic faith. The advance of regalism during the eighteenth century had 
placed the king still more firmly at the centre of the political system, reinforcing the 
monarch as the apex of a hierarchical social order ordained by God, organized by rank 
and divided into corporations. In the realm of ideas, then, the king was a charismatic 
figure: he was the bridge between the divine and the mundane, the embodiment of a 
metaphysical order revealed by the Christian religion.  
Such powerful and pervasive ideas persuaded many to defend the monarchy. Indeed, 
royalism seems to have reached across the social spectrum from the richest to the poorest 
elements of society. Evidence from both Mexico and South America suggests, for 
example, that Indian communities tended to remain loyal to the Spanish monarchy. Their 
reasons no doubt include both genuine commitment to a system into which they had been 
firmly incorporated as Christians subjects of the crown, alongside a preference for a 
paternalist system in which the „republica de indios‟ enjoyed the protection of the king 
and, through its direct relationship to the crown, some degree of autonomy.  
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Examples of Indian fidelity abound. In southern Peru, most Indian communities 
remained faithful to the royal cause. The Indian nobles of Cuzco was a particularly firm 
bastion. Despite loss of wealth and status after the Túpac Amaru rebellion, they remained 
committed to the Spanish monarchy on which they depended and did not rebel against 
Spanish government until 1814.
13
 In New Granada, the Indians of Pasto and Santa Marta 
played important roles in defending enclaves of royalist government, while Indian 
communities in coastal Caracas and Cartagena also favoured the royalist side against its 
republican enemies.
14
 This loyalty usually reflected the importance of traditional 
leadership and its ability to sustain a following, as well as political calculations arising 
from local disputes over resources. Indeed, where such leadership was either absent or 
divorced from the communities, then loyalty to the crown was more fragile. In Upper 
Peru, for example, especially in the region around La Paz, the divorce between the 
peasantry and the traditional authority of cacicazgos, many of which had passed into the 
hands of whites, made Indians more prone to rebel against Spanish rule.  
Fidelity to the name of Fernando VII and in defence of his monarchy was, conversely, 
also expressed in rebellions against Spanish rule, as was vividly demonstrated in Mexico. 
While Indian communities in much of southern Mexico and Central America remained 
passively loyal to the crown, displaying a tolerance of, if not a preference for the status 
quo, Indian peasants in central and northern Mexico joined in insurrection and 
insurgency. But, in the Hidalgo rebellion and subsequent insurgency directed against the 
viceregal authorities, loyalty to Fernando VII and the principle of monarchy remained 
strong. Hidalgo and Allende, co-leaders of the great insurrection of 1810, presented 
themselves as defenders of Fernando VII and „holy religion‟, both, it seems, essential 
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qualifications for political leaders who aspired to widespread support. It may be that 
members of the creole directorate of the insurgency did not believe in the fernandino 
mantra –certainly Allende expressed some scepticism- but the fact that they intoned it 
reflects a belief that obeisance to „el deseado‟ was essential for sustaining popular 
support. Peasant voices reinforce the impression that popular rebellion was underpinned 
by a commitment to throne and altar, a commitment that was sometimes coloured by 
messianic beliefs about a saviour king. Testimonies taken from captured rebels record the 
beliefs that Fernando VII was present in Mexico and guiding the rebellion; that he was in 
league with Hidalgo and Allende; that he had joined with the Virgin of Guadaloupe to 
defeat the Spanish. In others, others stood in for Fernando VII: thus Hidalgo and Morelos 
were sometimes spoken of as kings for Mexico, as, more surprisingly, was the wealthy 
creole landowner Ignacio Allende during his time as Hidalgo‟s deputy.15 
Popular monarchism can also be found among other subaltern social groups who 
occupied a lowly position in the social hierarchy. In southern New Granada, for example, 
the free black and coloureds of the Patía Valley played a key part in resistance to the 
confederation of autonomous cities in the Cauca region and as allies of the Indians of 
Pasto; in Venezuela, the pardos of Valencia opposed the revolutionary government in 
Caracas, as did the mixed race groups of the Llanos, whom Boves converted into the 
republic‟s military nemesis. Even slaves joined the loyalists in Venezuela, where royalist 
military commanders turned to them for armed support against creole landowners.
16
  
If Spanish American commitment to the monarchy derived resilience from a broad 
social base, it was also energized by the political revolution that took place in 
interregnum Spain. A new kind of monarchism sprang from the creation of the Cortes of 
Cádiz which, in 1812, formally turned Bourbon absolutism into a constitutional 
monarchy that awaited completion by the return of Fernando VII. In American regions 
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which remained under royalist control, the change was welcome to many: it seemed to 
fulfil aspirations for autonomy within a reformed empire, where Americans might enjoy 
greater participation in government while avoiding the social upheaval that might result 
from more radical political change. Mexico was the most striking example of a country 
where modified monarchism won allies for the crown. Not only did it appeal to American 
elites by providing for their fuller representation in government, but it also won support 
in small communities (over 1.000 inhabitants) who were now able to exercise greater 
influence over their own affairs by establishing „ayuntamientos constitucionales‟.17  
Respect for monarchy was, more surprisingly, also strong among the autonomous 
governments set up by the juntas which rejected the Spanish Regency and Cortes. The 
first Spanish American juntas, from Caracas in the north to Santiago de Chile in the 
south, all acknowledged Fernando VII as their legitimate king, and presented themselves 
as depositaries of his sovereignty. So, too, did Hidalgo, Morelos and other leaders of the 
insurgency in Mexico. When the juntas moved to the next stage of their political 
evolution and created constitutions, several continued to recognise Fernando VII as their 
sovereign, albeit with the rider that he would have to come to reign in their territories e.g. 
Cundinamarca. Only a minority formally rejected both Spain and its king, and became 
independent republics during Fernando‟s interregnum (e.g. Caracas and Cartagena in 
1811). 
There were many reasons for this formal adherence to Fernando VII and the principle 
of monarchy. In some instances, it was a flag of convenience. Those who wished to make 
a radical break with Spain wore the „mask of Ferdinand‟ in order to secure popular 
support for revolutionary political objectives which enjoyed little public sympathy.
18 
On 
the whole, however, it is more plausible to see allegiance to the king as evidence of the 
strength of a political culture rooted in the past and anchored by religion.
19
 The images, 
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institutions and practices of kingship were so deeply embedded in Hispanic political and 
cultural life that they dominated the political imagination and shaped thinking about the 
significance of the monarchy‟s crisis. In the vacuum left by the vacatio regis, the 
lawyers, clerics, cabildantes, and other notables who took part in the debates held in 
cabildos and juntas de gobierno in 1808-10 reflected the political practices and thinking 
of local elites under the old regime, that is the composite Hispanic monarchy which had 
been modified but not transformed by the Bourbons. Facing crisis at the centre, they 
turned to what they knew. Thus, in debates about the locus of authority in the king‟s 
absence, they interpreted their position in terms of the neo-scholastic vision of the 
sovereign who derived his right to power from a pact with the „people‟ (to whom 
sovereignty reverted in his absence), and drew on concepts taken from Hispanic 
intellectual traditions, transmitted through the study of natural and canon law in 
American universities.
20
 The appeal to an Hispanic „ancient constitution‟ was one such 
invocation of Hispanic intellectual and political traditions.
21
 At the same time, the cabildo 
was the primary forum for decision-making, again reflecting recourse to Spanish political 
traditions, in this case to political bodies that had probably been strengthened by Bourbon 
reform in the later eighteenth century.
22
  
Such responses were a natural way for American elites to cope with emergency within 
the existing system of government, while also taking advantage of the crisis to assert their 
influence without preserving social peace. By deploying legalistic justifications for the 
temporary transfer of sovereignty, they not only found a legal way to take power but, in 
assuming the mantle of the legitimate king, they also upheld the continuity of the existing 
social order.  
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This did not mean that the monarchical order was untouched by innovation. As the 
juntas de gobierno and their successors grappled with the problems of government, they 
began to move away from reliance on traditional Hispanic ideas and drew on other 
sources too, notably the primary texts of the French and American revolutions. The early 
constitutions of New Granada and Venezuela are thus replete with references drawn from 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and from the federalist thinking of North American 
statesmen. But they were not merely copies of imported templates. Indeed, the adoption 
of federalism in New Granada and Venezuela is an striking example of the fusion of 
Hispanic and North American political ideas.  
Clearly, the federalist project was an initiative from above, from men within the 
cultured elites who were familiar with liberal political ideas. But it is misleading to see 
the federalist project as simply applying foreign political formulae in disregard of local 
realities. At the very least, this fails to explain why the federalist model was so 
enthusiastically taken up during the first independence of New Granada and Venezuela. 
Federalism made more immediate sense to political leaders in those regions than did the 
notion of a single republic for reasons that had much more to do with their political 
experience than with their access to foreign political texts. After all, they represented 
regions with distinctive cultural characteristics, different economic interests, and 
inherited rivalries, all of which pointed to a future as separate political entities. They had 
also imbibed the vision of a composite monarchy which, having been composed of reinos 
which owed allegiance to the King of Castile, became sovereigns in his absence. In these 
circumstances, unity under a central power was not automatic; it had to be negotiated 
between independent states, each of which aimed to create its own constitution.
23
 
It seems, then, that, Spanish Americans did not import liberal ideas in order to initiate 
or develop movements for constitutional change or for independence. During Fernando‟s 
interregnum, ideas and practices inherited from the Habsburg composite monarchy (and 
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perhaps strengthened by Bourbon reforms which fortified municipal government) were 
the starting point for change. Under the juntas de gobierno of 1810, they provided the 
ideological platform for autonomous constitutional experiments which shifted allegiance 
away from Spain and towards independence and republicanism. In areas where Spanish 
governments were not supplanted by juntas (Mexico and Peru were the most important), 
the political system also moved along a new trajectory, but this time driven from without 
rather than within, from the constitutional experimentation of the metropolitan Cortes 
which aimed at political reconstruction within the confines of a recomposed Spanish 
monarchy.  
These two broad movements towards constitutional change, one heading towards 
republicanism and the other towards a new constitutional empire, was stopped in 1814 by 
military power. In Spain, British and Spanish forces defeated the French and, with the 
end of the Peninsular war, opened the way to the restoration of Fernando VII and, with it, 
the suppression of the Cortes and end of the constitutional regime. In Spanish America, 
American loyalism made a key contribution to the reinstitution of the monarchy by 
sustaining Spanish rule and defeating, or at least containing, threats to Spanish authority. 
This ensured that Fernando VII‟s restoration to the throne of Spain was matched by his 
restoration as king in most of Spanish America.  
The Disappearance of Monarchy 
The restoration of Fernando VII in 1814 was, however, a false dawn. By 1825, three 
centuries of monarchical rule came to an end throughout most of the old empire, and the 
Spanish monarchy survived only in diminished form in regions which remained under the 
sovereignty of Spain, until replaced by the first republic in 1873. Why, then, did the 
concept of monarchy fade in the decade after its return in 1814? And why did it make no 
return under independent governments in the1820s (with the sole and very brief 
exception of Agustin Iturbide in 1821)?  
Explanation of the end of the Spanish monarchy is, in large part, co-terminous with 
explanation of the fall of Spanish empire and the creation of independent Spanish 
American states. But the decline and fall of the empire does not wholly explain why the 
monarchical form of government, which had been so central to political thinking and 
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behaviour for so long, disappeared with the end of Spanish rule. I will draw this paper to 
a close by suggesting some of the reasons why monarchy faded with the dissolution of 
the Spanish monarchy in America after 1814. 
One major cause of the fall of the Spanish monarchy, and the concomitant disappearance 
of the institution of monarchy, was the failure of Fernando VII. The sardonic epithet 
applied to the Bourbon émigrés who returned to France after Napoleon‟s fall -as people 
who had „forgotten nothing and learned nothing‟- fits Fernando well. Before going into 
exile, his political experience was formed by life in a royal family whose King and Queen 
he resented, in a court riven by intense factionalism. His brief period as king in 1808 
brought no experience of government, and while in exile he had been disconnected from 
the forces which reshaped politics in the Spanish world. On his return to Spain, he had no 
clear plans beyond an urge to return to the status quo ante 1808. Fernando was, most 
historians agree, deeply insecure, fiercely anti-liberal and, perhaps because of his 
insecurity, quick to try to assert himself as an authoritarian figure. This state of mind 
dictated his immediate political goals: to destroy the institutions of representative 
government created in the constitutionalist years; to purge prominent liberals from public 
life and ally himself with the reactionary serviles (conservative deputies in the Cortes) 
who sought to turn back the clock; to choose ministers who would mirror his views and 
act on his decisions. His determination to put his stamp on Spain was, however, not 
matched by insight into what might best serve Spain as it emerged from the devastation 




Ferdinand‟s reactionary disposition was encouraged by the repressive political climate in 
Europe at large. After Napoleon‟s defeat at Waterloo, the recovery of Spain‟s American 
empire was underwritten by European statesmen at the 1815 Congress of Vienna. In 
agreeing to rebuild the political structures torn down during the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars, the Congress and the Holy Alliance which emerged from it created 
a political context that favoured the reconstruction of imperial Spain.  
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Reconstruction was also favoured by the end of war in the Peninsula. Peace not only 
allowed Spanish government to focus again on imperial governance; it also left Spain 
with a large army (about 150,000 men) which, although it had not always distinguished 
itself in the war against France, was more experienced, combat-ready and, above all, 
more available for overseas deployment than any Spanish army had been since 1810. Its 
deployment in America was, moreover, encouraged by groups with powerful political 
leverage -not least of which was the body of Spanish merchant who lived from the 
transatlantic trade- who were convinced that Spain could retain its place among the 
concert of powers only by recreating the mercantilist and authoritarian structures of the 
pre-war Bourbon monarchy.  
By committing itself to such intentions without the resources to achieve them, the 
Fernandine regime embarked on a difficult course. Perhaps its central mistake was to 
commit itself to military solutions and, in America, to create government of a distinctly 
militaristic character. This flowed from Fernando‟s restoration. His return to power owed 
much to army officers who believed that the army had been mistreated during the 
constitutionalist period; few defended the constitutionalist regime, and some played key 
parts in restoring Fernando to the plenitude of power. Military men then subsequently 
contributed to the failure of his American policy by backing a military solution which 
imposed increasing strain on the Spanish army, while also proving unable to defeat 
resurgent independence movements, and alienating American populations who might 
have been amenable to a more reformist approach.
25
 The incipient crisis at the heart of 
government broke out in the Riego revolt of 1820, when army officers joined with 
liberals to restore a constitutionalist government. But it was too late to save the 
monarchy. Indeed, new policies exacerbated Spain‟s problems in America. By now, the 
Spanish monarchy had lost credibility. After abandoning the experiment with 
constitutional monarchy in 1814, an experiment which might conceivably have saved the 
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monarchy -perhaps in the form envisaged by the Conde de Aranda in 1783-
26
 and 
insisting on a return to absolutism, Fernando‟s regime pushed its American opponents 
further along the path to republicanism on which some had already embarked in 1810-14.  
The return of Fernando VII did not, however, immediately eliminate interest in 
constitutional monarchy in Spanish America, outside Spanish rule. In the United 
Provinces of Río de la Plata, his restoration provoked a panicked interest in 
rapprochement with Spain. Posadas, who became Supreme Director of the United 
Provinces in January 1814, sent Belgrano and Rivadavia to London to ask the British to 
prevent Spain from launching a new offensive and, covertly, to negotiate a peaceful 
solution in which the Río de la Plata would become either an independent constitutional 
monarchy under a Bourbon prince or an autonomous state within a reformed Spanish 
monarchy. When Alvear became Supreme Director in January 1815, he went a step 
further, and sought to defend the United Provinces by attaching them to the British 
monarchy, and he requested that Britain send troops to Buenos Aires to enforce British 
sovereignty. In London, meanwhile, Manuel Sarratea, another Buenos Aires‟ envoy in 
Europe, took another tack: he contacted the former king Carlos IV of Spain to persuade 
him to propose his youngest son as the future king of an independent monarchy in the Río 
de la Plata. In 1816, at the Congress of Tucumán which declared rioplatense 
independence, Belgrano also argued for constitutional monarchy on the grounds that it 
would foster internal unity and order while improving the external image of the 
independent power. Such schemes had no purchase in Spain, however; indeed, when 
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Casa Flores reported on them from his post in Rio de Janeiro in 1817, it was mainly to 
urge Spain to take advantage of rioplatense weakness and to send a military expedition.
27
 
These arguments recurred in 1818, when France made discreet diplomatic enquiries 
into the possibility of establishing independent Bourbon monarchies in America. The 
French foreign minister sent an envoy to Río de la Plata, where Puerreydón, the Supreme 
Director was willing to consider the installation of a foreign prince.
28
 This secret policy 
was soon abandoned, however, when it became clear that it might do irreparable damage 
to relations with Spain. The prospect of a foreign prince for Peru nonetheless remained 
alive while General San Martin was leading the campaign against royalist Peru, only to 
recede again during Bolívar‟s ascendancy. It then briefly reappeared in another form 
when some of Bolívar‟s followers favoured making him king during the early 1820s. In 
the event, Bolívar found means to exercise strong central authority through the 
constitutions he created, and only Mexico experimented with setting up a monarchy. The 
Plan de Iguala offered Fernando VII the throne if he came to Mexico, and in his absence 
Agustín Iturbide became Emperor in 1821. The briefness of Agustín I‟s reign suggests 
that monarchy had lost its attractions in Mexico, even in the new form. But Mexican 
interest in monarchy persisted among conservatives, who eventually succeeded in the 
1860s in launching Maximilian‟s monarchy with the backing of France. This was the 
only such experiment seen in Spanish America. Another plan to do so, floated by Flores 
in Ecuador, came to nothing.  
Why did schemes for constitutional monarchies fail? In the first place, it was difficult 
to find acceptable suitable candidates, whether American or European. In Spanish 
America, with its truncated aristocracy, there were serious dynastic claims. Ideas about 
enthroning Incas, floated by Miranda in the early 1800s and by Belgrano in 1816, never 
won any serious support, for reasons which are not hard to imagine. Placing European 
princes at the head of new constitutional monarchies was, on the other hand, a solution 
which also suffered numerous practical weaknesses. In the first place, there was a distinct 
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scarcity of European candidates who were willing and acceptable to the leading 
international powers, particularly England and France. Secondly, Spain‟s intransigent 
refusal to recognise Spanish America‟s independent states further inhibited recruitment. 
Thirdly, the idea of sharing out monarchies among Fernando VII‟s relatives was 
impractical, given that he had only two brothers, neither of whom were suitable 




There was, moreover, a certain absurdity about such schemes. They suggest a 
patronising belief that the only serious option for benighted peoples who had suffered the 
chaos of war and political upheaval was rule by Europeans, and monarchical schemes 
thus ignored what was probably the principal reason for the end of monarchy in America: 
namely, the discrediting of monarchy that stemmed from the disastrous political career of 
Fernando VII, together with a decline of interest in monarchy as republican solutions 
gained greater traction. Although there were important thinkers and statesmen who 
continued to see republican equality as the inevitable road to disorder and conflict, the 
advocates of monarchy seldom made headway in practical politics. In the immediate 
aftermath of republican triumphs in war, monarchism must have seemed a relic of the 
past, and there was certainly a tendency to see the political future along the lines laid 
down by the United States. By the1830s and 1840, such optimism had often faded, but by 
that time republican government was sufficiently established to make a revival of 
monarchy unpalatable and, to all but the most desperate conservatives, inconceivable.  
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